Unofficial Ukraine war diplomacy? What’s Possible—and What Isn’t

Track II diplomacy, such as dialogues among non-governmental Ukrainian and Russian experts for potential official consideration are not realistically safe right now given the scale of the war. Even well-intentioned “citizen diplomats” could face detention or legal jeopardy if their activities are misread. Is e-diplomacy, strictly by email and video conference, any safer than travel? Yes—but there are some matters to be certainly aware of. Ukraine and Russia have similar laws that can potentially incriminate collaboration with “the other” or designate diplomacy initiatives as emerging from “undesirable organizations”. In the current state of affairs, surveillance and platform controls can still endanger participants in—or connected to—both jurisdictions.

A decade ago, there was more space. International Channels for Diplomacy (ICDiplomacy) began convening Ukraine–Russia–West e-dialogues, strictly by email and video conference, one of which had a Royal Military College of Canada professor with UN peacekeeping credentials serve as mediator, and the NATO Association of Canada (formerly the NATO Council of Canada) collaborated—signals of procedural neutrality that helped bring participants to the table despite sensitivities about affiliations. While the dialogues were at times tense, the participants felt the mediation was professional and neutral. 

Today’s politics are harder. On March 28, 2025, Mr. Volodymyr Zelensky is reported to have said that he could communicate with Russian business and regional actors genuinely seeking to end the war. For those learning about multi-track diplomacy, it’s important to note that Track II diplomacy and unofficial diplomacy are not the same things. Track II often involves experts, academics or think tank analysts exploring ideas, solutions and interests to a shared problem whereas unofficial diplomacy is broader and may involve business leaders, NGOs, religious/community figures, and cultural exchanges. There can be cases where current officials sit in on Track II meetings, unofficially. Every Track II effort is unofficial, but not all unofficial efforts are Track II. Returning to the report regarding Mr. Zelensky being open to meet Russian business leaders—is an instinct that looks like Track 1.5 but, in practice, would raise issues fairly quickly from Moscow, especially when there already are official avenues for negotiation that have made some progress, such as those hosted by Turkey. 

Practitioner risk assessments reinforce the caution. ICDiplomacy has heard directly from one expert that is affiliated with the American Committee for US–Russia Accord that it is not safe for either side to run Ukraine–Russia unofficial talks right now, given participant safety. Separately, a former administrator of a Ukrainian university, now an academic residing long-term in another continent and a strong supporter of the Kyiv government, warned that Track II diplomacy in person or via electronic communications, can still create serious misunderstandings between participants (including those abroad) and their respective governments. These practitioner views, conveyed to ICDiplomacy, align with the legal and political hazards described above.

So what, if anything, is feasible? On the one hand, senior U.S. and Russian officials and analysts have at times described the conflict as a proxy war between nuclear powers, further shrinking the political space for citizen diplomacy. On the other hand, generally the same top-level political contacts have also created marginal openings that Track II can use to prepare options. In August 2025, the Trump–Putin summit in Alaska ended without a deal, but it nonetheless signaled a narrow channel for engagement, and subsequent discussion towards a potential meeting in Budapest shows slow and periodic momentum. In assessing the overall feasibility of US-Russia Track II talks, they are possible but their diplomatic success and ability to transfer to Track 1.5 is limited at best. US–Russia Track II talks can focus on risk-reduction, escalation management, arms control, strategic-stability guardrails and the root causes of the “proxy war” that officials from both sides see — topics that do not negotiate Ukraine’s fate yet are vital issues for global security. 

A subsequent article will explore approaches that foster distrust in US-Russia diplomacy, and how to rebuild credible US-Russia Track II dialogues.