After RAND’s Missteps: Rebuilding Credible US–Russia Track II Talks

The 2025 Trump–Putin summit in Alaska and the periodic negotiations that followed provide an opening for US–Russia Track II dialogues. In recent years, nongovernmental US–Russia expert dialogues on strategic stability have continued in limited forms. For example, RAND’s 2025 conference proceedings mention one such Track II process (see Scenarios for the Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability and Arms Control: Results from a Track II Dialogue).

However, it is also important for prospective Track II hosts or participants to analyze what actions potentially ended RAND’s role in US–Russia diplomacy. Their conference proceedings mention that the Russian government designated RAND as an "undesirable entity" after their last meeting in late 2023, and that Russian participants could face fines or criminal charges. This led Russian participants to stop communicating with RAND. However, their conference proceedings do not mention an earlier 2019 research brief by RAND (see Overextending and Unbalancing Russia: Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options)—published long before Russia engaged in armed conflict with Ukraine in 2022. The research brief discussed methods for "undermining Russian domestic stability," as well as "measures that would ... cause Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or cause the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence."

Within this research theme, one report concluded that "Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbas region. More Russian aid to the separatists and an additional Russian troop presence would likely be required, leading to larger expenditures, equipment losses, and Russian casualties. The latter could become quite controversial at home, as it did when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan." Russian security analysts are certainly aware of RAND’s role throughout the Cold War and how it continues to receive millions in funding from the US Army to examine Russian vulnerabilities.

Such research reports, however analytical or legitimate Western governments may regard them, can also be seen as contributing to Russian distrust of negotiations and offers of guarantees by the West, especially as Russia likely views such reports as evidence of provocation regarding the very conflict we have today. It is also probable that the RAND report became part of official US policy under President Biden, which ranged from weakening Russia to ending the Putin administration. To many in Russia (and not only in Russia), publishing that research and later convening Track II diplomacy with Russian counterparts looks inconsistent at best, compromising trust and, by extension, other Track II efforts. As such, ICDiplomacy offers three recommendations on rebuilding US–Russia Track II talks:

1 - Clarify the mission

Experts proposing war resolutions must choose: either facilitate neutral diplomatic space (like Turkey's role in the Russia-Ukraine war) or advocate for military solutions. Those advocating for military solutions—the majority—should, for ethical reasons, seek professional permission from the counterpart's foreign ministry before engaging citizens in Track II diplomacy, ensuring transparency and reducing risk.

2 - Utilize e-diplomacy

In US-Russia relations, e-diplomacy offers a safer, more viable approach than traditional, private, in-person Track II meetings. Electronic communications, while not fully private, allow governments to monitor the process for procedural neutrality, making them potentially more open to Track II efforts that transition to Track 1.5. This semi-transparency is a departure from traditional diplomacy, but it may attract less governmental scrutiny than private physical gatherings, proving that nothing is truly private anyway. Academic engagement should be pursued within a genuine conflict resolution framework, ideally using university credentials to leverage the perception of academic neutrality.

3 - Respect timing

Due to the extreme sensitivity of US-Russia relations, unlike other conflicts where Track I and II can run concurrently, Track II should be reserved for when Track I talks have failed. Exceptions can be made for negotiations on unrelated or non-overlapping topics.

Ultimately, rebuilding credible US–Russia Track II diplomacy requires a fundamental shift in how Western institutions approach conflict resolution. The era where organizations could simultaneously architect strategies for an adversary’s collapse and claim to be neutral brokers of peace has passed; as the RAND experience demonstrates, such strategic ambiguity is now fatal to diplomatic trust. By strictly separating partisan advocacy from diplomatic facilitation, leveraging the transparency and safety of digital channels, and respecting the delicate timing of official negotiations, the expert community can begin to repair the damage done to these essential back-channels. If Track II diplomacy is to serve its true purpose as a fail-safe for global stability, it must prioritize the safety of its participants and the clarity of its intent, ensuring that when official talks falter, a genuine and untainted pathway to de-escalation remains open.